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Germany has prescribed austerity and restraint for Europe,
while at the same time undertaking extensive fiscal stimulus
packages at home.
by Blog Admin
The eurozone crisis is one of the most significant challenges EU policymakers have yet
faced. Waltraud Schelkle  examines Germany’s reaction to the crisis, finding that while
Germany proposed economic self-restraint in 2008, it also embarked on a policy of
domestic fiscal stimulus to the welfare system and car industry that amounted to 3 per cent
of GDP. She argues that hard times can often lead to a delicate balance being struck
between the presentation of policies to the electorate on the one hand, and the need to
balance the needs of interest groups on the other: what she terms the ‘dual politics of
policymaking’.
Times are hard f or economic policymaking. A f inancial crisis of  unprecedented scope shattered
polit icians’ belief s in the received economic wisdom that had inf ormed two decades of  continuous
ref orm. Ever since the demise of  pump-priming Keynesianism in the late 1970s, governments have tried
to reduce their involvement in the direct provision of  goods and services. The project of  European
integration was revived in the mid-1980s and became a major f orce in redef ining what national
government should and could do when intervening in markets. Yet, in 2008-2009, the international
f inancial system would have collapsed if  public authorit ies had remained f aithf ul to the various hands-
tying innovations instead of  giving monetary and f iscal lif e support to banks and governments.
The German response to the f inancial crisis in Europe since 2008 is of  interest not least because the
government plays a key role f or the EU’s concerted ef f ort to combat recession and a meltdown of  euro
bond markets. This allows us to understand why the European Union presents such a contradictory
image in its crisis management, namely of  indecisiveness and hyperactivity, of  t imidity and hyperbole.
The irony to be explored is that what
the German government stated publicly,
and at the EU level categorically, f itted
the stereotype of  ordoliberal Germany
but this was the opposite of  what it
practiced at home. The German
Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed
self -restraint and principled collective
action only where absolutely
necessary. In practice, the German
government topped up the in-built
stabilisers with a sizeable subsidy to
encourage labour hoarding by f irms
and generous demand-side policies f or
the car industry, undeterred by
considerable spillovers that also
stabilised demand f or its European
neighbours to the East.
In contrast to the then French President Sarkozy, Angela Merkel did not give any speech that can be
called grand. In f act, those speeches that the press considered to be signif icant and f ormally important –
in parliament or to an annual party conf erence – were crit icised as missed opportunit ies across the
polit ical spectrum. She was short and specif ic on the subject of  Europein her f irst crisis speech in 2008,
polit ical spectrum. She was short and specif ic on the subject of  Europein her f irst crisis speech in 2008,
arguing that there are two ways in which national and European crisis management should not be linked.
First, she crit icised the Irish way of  protecting only domestic banks and discriminating against those f rom
other member states. Second, she distanced herself  f rom a proposal by President Sarkozy f or a
European sovereign wealth f und that would protect European f irms against takeovers. It was never
created because theUK was also opposed and the European Commission skeptical of  its protectionist
air.
The German government at the time, a Grand Coalit ion between Christian and Social Democrats, did not
show such self - restraint in practice. The f lagship of  the German stimulus package, init iated by the Social
Democrats, became a short- t ime work programme that was made more generous in terms of  duration f or
workers (up to 24 months f or 2009, 18 months f or 2010) and relief  f rom social security contributions f or
employers (50 per cent). By comparison, France also had a short- term work programme but limited in
duration to 6 weeks at a t ime and a maximum of  600 hours per year, i.e. the equivalent of  about 4.5
months. The German programme could be extended by an ordinance of  the f ederal employment minister
and did not require parliamentary approval, as the Social Democratic minister in charge noted publicly.
The Employment Agency paid 60 per cent (67 per cent f or parents) of  the net wage lost due to short-
t ime work. Participation exploded f rom about 50,000 in May 2008 to 1.5 million workers in May 2009,
maintaining an estimated equivalent of  500,000 f ull- t ime jobs, keeping unemployment at a stable level
despite a deep drop in GDP.
Germany also extended support through a more generous cash-f or-clunkers programme than France.
The car-scrapping scheme paid a so-called ‘environmental premium’ of  €2,500 f or the acquisit ion of  a
new, cleaner car that replaced a car at least nine years old, no matter where it had been produced. This
stabilised production in other countries as well because the import share in the value of  cars is
considerably higher than f or the average of  consumer goods. For sure, the government was also
tempted by protectionism, except that it would never admit to blatant patriotic interf erence. The
government allegedly conditioned credit guarantees f or a third party’s takeover of  Opel f rom General
Motors on the maintenance of  national production capacities. Backed byBelgium,Spainand theUK,
member states that saw their Opel plants under threat, the Commission undermined German
protectionism by invoking EU state aid rules.
The outcome was one of  the biggest f iscal stabilisation ef f orts in the EU. The net ef f ect of  f iscal
stimulus (def icit- increasing) measures amounted to 3.0 per cent of  German GDP over 2008-2010 (by
comparison, the stimulus in France amounted to 0.6 per cent only). The automatic stabilisers accounted
f or an additional boost to the economy of  4.2 per cent of  German GDP (of  3.4 per cent in France, data
based on OECD and EUROMOD). High tax revenues in an economy growing at over 3 per cent in 2010-11
allowed Germany to reduce its def icit under the ‘excessive def icit ’ threshold of  the Stability Pact.
What kind of  polit ics can explain this dif f erence between polit ical presentation and ef f ective policymaking
(which a detailed comparison could show is the reverse image of  France under Sarkozy)? A combination
of  electoral and interest group polit ics is arguably the answer. Hard times, in the sense of  an economic
and intellectual crisis, are indeed times of  very visible polit ics, even when policymakers choose to present
themselves as merely responding to economic imperatives. The public presentation of  policies must
speak to constituencies and pivotal groups of  voters, by communicating a credible ideological stance or
by conveying competence in solving their problems. Actual policies must accept that certain economic
actors can make or break a policy, interest groups with veto power have to be satisf ied, and
redistributive ef f ects of  problem-solving may be undesirable. This discrepancy is a constant source of
f rustration f or voters and has contributed to the popular cynicism that democratic polit ics is inherently
hypocrit ical.
The dual polit ics of  policymaking in hard times has arguably wider signif icance f or the polit ical economy
of  crisis management in capitalist democracies. The lack of  a grand narrative about the role of  the
polit ical f itted the German government’s strategy of  responding to economic needs with a display of  the
popular polit ics of  restraint. German polit ical elites instinctively f avour a cautious approach, possibly
because the rhetoric of  a strong state is taboo, but also in order to avoid overstretching state
capacities. So the government chose to be pushed into decisive state intervention rather than to engage
in it proactively. Even if  it  had not worked out so well, Merkel could have stated that she never pretended
to save the market f rom itself . The problem with this strategy is that policymakers are always behind the
curve because they restrain their capacity f or intervention and thus become driven by market f orces.
The f allout f rom the eurozone crisis is a case in point. The German Chancellor wanted EU polit ical
decision-making to manage and contain economic interdependence. But the disciplinarian approach led to
more interdependence in economic terms because markets remain unstable. The ref orms of  economic
governance have also increased interdependence in polit ical terms. The corresponding ref lex of
responding to every economic imbalance with ever more intrusive intervention in national budgetary
processes polit icises conf licts over economic adjustment in an unintended way.
The polit icisation of  the EU has not been accompanied by an increase in the capacity f or macroeconomic
policymaking. The lesson f rom Germany’s crisis management is that the popular polit ics of  restraint
needs an ef f ective policy of  stabilisation. Hence, a Europe Union emulating German crisis management
can deliver neither economic stabilisation nor polit ical legit imacy.
This article is based on a chapter in Nancy Bermeo and Jonas Pontusson (eds) (2012), Coping with Crisis.
Government Reactions to the Great Recession, Russell Sage Foundation.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/TesC2S
_______________________________
About the author 
Waltraud Schelkle – LSE European Institute
Waltraud Schelkle is a Senior Lecturer in Polit ical Economy at the European Institute of
the London School of  Economics. Furthermore, she is an Adjunct Prof essor of
Economics at the Economics Department of  the Free University of  Berlin. Previously,
Schelkle worked as a development economist at the prestigious German Institute of
Development inBerlin. She is particularly interested in the polit ical economy of  European
integration.
Related posts:
1. A No vote in Ireland’s ref erendum on the Fiscal Treaty might contribute to the demise of  the
current mindset of  austerity. (10.2)
2. With a rising current account surplus, Germany has benef itted the most f rom the adoption of  the
Euro. Its plan f or EU austerity will likely make things worse. (10.6)
3. Collective bargaining has been decentralised in the UK and Germany over the past three decades.
But in Germany, unions have retained much more power. (10.5)
